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LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL. LV
prudence . In the nineteenth century, the English courts sought
refuge from the policy implications of their decisions by applying
established concepts to analogous problems . In Miliangos the
analytical approach virtually disappeared from the rhetoric of the
House of Lords . Perhaps the only remaining areas of its influence
are in subjects where the rules of law are arbitrary, or so per-
vasively integrated into the network of legal relations as to require
extensive ancillary law reform, or where the implications of a
reform in the law are overridingly political in nature .
The use by the House of Lords of sociological reasoning in
Miliangos contrasts sharply with its iconoclastic view of the role
of lower courts in the law reform process . This attitude is probably
a lingering vestige of the analytical approach seeking once and for
all answers in specific rules of conduct . But the search for certainty
in law is futile and often counter-productive . If laws are to be
adjusted to changing social conditions, then rules of law can be
no more stable than their social environment . To preclude lower
courts from participating in updating rules of law, at best, only
delays the reform until the case can be brought to the highest
court of appeal thus putting the parties to unnecessary expense .
But if the case is not appealed it postpones the law reform
indefinitely . The balance of real flexibility versus pretended cer-
tainty shows the value of allowing all levels of court to assess
social change and evaluate whether and how rules of law must
be adjusted . The House of Lords will surely be frustrated in its
campaign to exclude the lower courts from the law reform process .
DANIEL A. LAPRES*
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ONTARIO-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
REMEDIES-SOME PROBLEMS OF POURING OLD WINE INTO
NEW BOTTLES.-The shortcomings of the remedies available
at common law for securing the judicial review of administrative
action have become wearisomely familiar.' Their satisfactory
* Daniel A . Lapres, Paris, France .
' The position was clearly put by the late Professor S . A . de Smith,
when he said : "Until the Legislature intervenes, therefore, we shall continue
to have two sets of remedies against the usurpation or abuse of power by
administrative tribunals - remedies which overlap but do not coincide,
which must be sought in wholly distinct forms of proceedings, which are




removal has been more troublesome than might have been
anticipated. A preliminary choice is available to potential
reformers. The prerogative orders can be abolished and replaced
by a single statutory remedy of judicial review under which a
specified range of relief is available upon grounds set out in the
statute.2 Alternatively, an attempt may be made simply to
remove the obscure and unsatisfactory procedural and remedial
snares and anomalies from the common law remedies, with or
without some tinkering with the grounds of review associated
with them, leaving enough of the common law intact so as to
enable the development of the law of judicial review within its
existing contours . The disadvantage of the first method is that
the baby of a largely satisfactory and familiar substantive law
of judicial review may be thrown out with the bath water
of its disfiguring' procedural and remedial technicalities and
archaisms. The disadvantage of the second method is that
reforming legislation may not succeed in totally eliminating the
unfortunate distinctions inherent in the common law remedies and
may create areas of uncertainty in the relationship between the
new remedy . and the old law.3
Thé Canadian attempts at reform to date have so far adopted
variants of the less radical approach.4 The purpose of this com-
jointly cover a very substantial area of the existing field of judicial control.
This state of affairs bears a striking resemblance to that which obtained
when English civil procedure was still bedevilled by the old forms of action ."
Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (1957),
Cmnd. 218, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix I, p . 10 .
2 This approach has been most notably urged by Professor K . C . Davis
in the course of a comparison between the United States of America's
Administrative Procedure Act and the common law remedies of judicial
review ; see in particular, Davis, English Administrative Law-An American
" View, [1962] P.L . 134.
3A reform inspired by Davis's approach also has to consider the
implications for the unreformed law ; thus, if habeas corpus were not in-
cluded in the reform, would certiorari in aid survive? For the version of
this problem that has arisen under the Federal Court Act, S.C., 1970-71-72,
c. 1, see, for example, Mitchell v . The Queen (1976), 61 D.L.R . (3d) 77
(S.C.C.) ; Pereira v . Minister of Manpower and Immigration (1976) Ont .
H.C ., as yet unreported .
4 For useful early commentaries on the legislation, see Mullan, The
Federal Court Act - a Misguided Attempt at Administrative Law Reform?
(1973), 23 U . of T.L.J . 14, and"Mullan, Reform of Judicial Review of Admin
istrative Action-The Ontario Way (1974), 12 O.H.L .J . 125 . The Report
on Remedies in Administrative Law, Cmnd . 6407, published in March
1976 by the English Law Commission (Law Com., No. 73) also attempts
only a limited reform; but it is clear that this resulted not from the Com-
mission's choice, but from the limited terms of reference imposed by the
Lord Chancellor under the Law Commissions Act 1965, c . 22, s. 3(i)(e) . See
the Report, pp . 1-5 .
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ment is to e)i2amine some recent decisions that probe aspects of
the relations.Iiip between the Judicial Review Procedure Act,
1971 5 and other remedies of judicial review of common law
and statutory origin.
Despite the historical background of the 1971 legislative
package in the McRuer Report and the reaction of critics who
have argued that undue importance has been given to lawyers
and the courts in the business of government,6 the implication
of some recent decisions is that the Judicial Review Procedure
Act, 1971 has reduced the availability of judicial review. The
intended impact of section 2(l) of the Act upon the former
prerogative orders of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition would
seem reasonably clear. For it provides in paragraph 1 that on
an application by way of an originating notice the court may
grant any relief that the applicant would be entitled to in pro-
ceedings for an order in the nature of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus . 'thus, subject to any other relevant provisions in
the Act,7 the court may grant relief corresponding to that
previously available under one of the prerogative orders, but
the applicant may only obtain the relief for which he
would have qualified under the relevant prerogative order.8
This effects no significant change in the law. Section 2(l)
paragraph 2, however, extends the benefits of summary procedure
to the remedies of declaration and injunction, insofar as declar-
5 S.O ., 1971, c. 48 .
'c See, for example, Willis, The McRuer Report : Lawyers' Values and
Civil Servants' Values (1968), 18 U. of T.L.J . 351.
7 S. 2(2) has reduced the importance of classifying a function as judi-
cial, for it extends "to any decision made in the exercise of a statutory
power of decision", the power of the court to quash for error of law on
the face of the record . S. 2(4) is apparently intended to remove some
untidiness from the old law by providing that the exercise of a statutory
power of decision may be set aside when the applicant is entitled to a
declaration. The term, "statutory power of decision", is defined in s. 1(f) ;
the legislative aim here is to substitute a new concept to cover powers
with a "judicial" flavour, whilst releasing the courts from the common
law quagmire of classification. See, Re Armstrong Investigators of Canada
Ltd and Turner (1976), 9 O.R. (2d) 284, at p. 288 (Div. Ct).
8 See, Mullan, (1974), 12 O.H.L.J . 125, at pp . 145-148. This view is
supported by Hughes J. in Re Hershoran and City of Windsor (1974),
1 O.R . (2d) 291, at p. 312: "Nor does the Judicial Review Procedure Act,
1971 appear to simplify the problem of classification of the function per-
formed by a tribunal, although it undoubtedly prunes away some of the
procedural difficulties which formerly encumbered access to the Court. To
paraphrase the well known words of F. W. Maitland, the prerogative writs
and orders in lieu thereof we have buried, but they rule us from their




atory or injunctive relief is sought in relation to the exercise
or failure to exercise a "statutory power" .9 Since the Act con-
cerns remedies in the area of public law it was necessary to
impose some such limitation upon remedies that are also widely
used in private law, but unnecessary in relation to the prerogative
orders which are, of course, only applicable to the discharge of
public functions.
Thus, where the relief sought upon an application for
judicial review is that the impugned decision be set aside, it
should be sufficient for the applicant to show that he would
be entitled to an order of certiorari . However, if the applicant
cannot establish this, he may, nonetheless, be awarded this
relief if he would be entitled a declaration in respect of a
decision that was an exercise of a "statutory power of decision".
Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971
and the Prerogative Orders
The reasoning of some recent decisions of the Ontario
courts is inconsistent with this analysis of the Act. In Re
Robertson and Niagara South Board of Education,"' an applica
tion for judicial review was made to the Divisional Court by
parents of children attending a school that the respondents had
resolved to close. The applicants sought to have the decision
quashed on the ground that they had been denied a fair hearing
before the resolution was passed . The application was refused.
The majority judgment regarded the case as raising, "the question
of whether the Divisional Court under the Judicial Review
Procedure Act, 1971 has jurisdiction to give the orders asked
for"."' Giving further emphasis to the jurisdictional nature of
the issue, Wright J. said :12
Our jurisdiction to deal positively with the issues thus raised depends
upon the interpretation of the exercise of a statutory power of decision.
. . .If the motion to close this school was the exercise of a statutory
power of decision under these sections, the Divisional Court has juris-
diction to review the decision judicially.
It is submitted that the language of the Act does not support
the conclusion that the Divisional Court may not set aside a
9 This term is defined by s. 1(g) . It is now possible to request any
combination of the forms of relief contained in s. 2.
10 (1973), 41 D.L.R . (3d) 57 (Ont . Div. Ct) ; 1Nlullan, (1974), 22
Chitty's L.J . 297.
11Ibid ., at p. 58, emphasis added.
12Ibid., at p. 59 .
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decision that would be reviewable by certiorari, but which is
not a "statutory power of decision". Since the applicants were
attacking the legality of the decision for the failure by the
Board to comply with the rules of natural justice, the court may
have confused the question of its jurisdiction to entertain an
application under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, for
judicial review of the decision on any ground, with the separate
question of whether the procedural code contained in the Statutory
Powers Procedure Act, 1971,13 was applicable, in this case, to
the Board. For the existence of a statutory power of decision
is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition precedent to
the applicability of the latter Act.14 It is ironical that just as
the availability of certiorari on any ground became indentified
with the applicability of the rules of natural justice, so the
Divisional Court appears here to limit its power to set aside
a decision of a public authority by reference to a statutory term,
the functions of which are to trigger the application of the
Statutory Powers Procedure Act, 1971, and to extend the range
of decisions that the court may set aside. 15 In his dissenting
judgment, Holland J. agreed that the respondents were not
exercising a statutory power of decision, but he persuasively
reasoned that this neither deprived the Divisional Court of
jurisdiction to review, nor exhausted the respondents' duties of
procedural fairness .l s
Unfortunately, Robertson does not stand alone. Thomp-
son J. appears to have fallen into the same error in Re Maurice
Rollins Construction Ltd and Township of South Fredericks
burgh.17 The company made an application for judicial review
to have a by-law passed by the respondent set aside on the
grounds of bad faith and want of notice . His Lordship stated
13 S.O ., 1971, c. 47 .
14 [bid., s . 3 (1). Wright J. refers to the fact that the term, "statutory
power of decision", is common to both Acts .
15 See, Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, supra, footnote 5, s. 2(2),
(4).
18 Supra, footnote 10, at p. 63 . Although the court, at p. 58, viewed
the applicants' locus standi with some scepticism, this does not appear to
be the basis upon which the court declined jurisdiction. Nor should the
fact that the applicants also sought injunctive relief be of relevance, since
the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, s. 2(l) para . 2, limits the power
to grant injunctive and declaratory relief by reference to the wider term,
"statutory power", as defined by s. i(g) .
17 (1976), 11 O.R . (2d) 418. Finding the matter to be urgent, Thomp-





that he could not quash the by-law in these proceedings since
it did not constitute the exercise of a statutory power of decision.
No reference is made in the judgment to any earlier judicial
pronouncement in point. Thompson J. stated, quite correctly,
that the Act extends the court's power to review, by authorising
it to set aside the exercise of a statutory power of decision for
error of law on the face of the record . He added :'s
If the decision is one made merely in the exercise of a statutory power
(as defined), as distinguished from a statutory power of decision (as
defined), then judicial review in the nature of certiorari is not indicated
and the applicant is left to whatever form of relief he may otherwise
have.
It is difficult to see the relationship between the former
observation and the conclusion that the court may only quash
an exercise of a statutory power of decision, especially since the
applicant's grounds of attack would normally be regarded as
going to the respondent's jurisdiction . Indeed, Thompson J.
went on to uphold the applicant's procedural attack and to
order that the by-law be declared invalid and set aside.l9
A similarly narrow view of the jurisdiction conferred by the
Judicial Review ]Procedure Act, 1971 is implicit in Re Florence
Nightingale Home and Scarborough Planning Board,20 in which
the applicants sought, on an application for judicial review, to
prohibit the Board from considering proposed amendments to
an official plan and zoning by-laws. The applicants alleged that
they had been denied an opportunity to be heard at the meeting
of the Board at which it was decided that the Board should
is Ibid ., at p. 422. In the next sentence he said that : "One must bear
in mind that certiorari at common law was an attack upon jurisdiction ."
This is misleading : R. v . Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal
ex parte Shaw, [1952] 1 Q.B . 338 . Indeed, the Judicial Review Procedure
Act, 1971, s. 2(2), assumes the existence of this ground of review and
extends it to bodies that may not have been characterized at common law
as amenable to certiorari because of their non-judicial nature : Re Becker
Milk Co. Ltd and Director of Employment Standards of the Ontario
Ministry of Labour (1974), 1 O.R . (2d) 739 (Div. Ct) .
is Ibid ., at p. 431. Unlike the majority in Robertson, Thompson J.
imposed upon the municipality a common law duty to give notice to the
applicant and an opportunity to be heard prior to the enactment of the
by-law, although he doubted whether the by-law was made in the exercise
of a statutory power of decision.
20 [1973] 1 O.R. 615 (Div. Ct) . Again, the court is primarily con-
cerned with the existence of a statutory power of decision for the purpose
of determining the applicability of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act,
supra, footnote 13 . See in contrast Chadwill Coal Co. Ltd v. Treasurer
etc . for Province of Ontario (1976), 1 M. P. I,. R. 25 (Div. Ct) .
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meet again to recommend a change to the official plan which
might, if adopted, further limit the use to which the applicants
could put their land . The Divisional Court appears to have
considered only whether the Board had thus exercised a statutory
power of decision . The court held that it had no power to prohibit
the Board from proceeding to the next stage of the decision-
making process because nothing had so far been decided which
had a sufficient finality upon the rights of the applicants to
amount to a "deciding or prescribing" of rights so as to amount
to the exercise of -a statutory power of decision . The court
addressed itself primarily to the applicability of the Statutory
Powers Procedure Act, 1971 .21 As in Robertson, however, it is
implicit in the judgments that, absent a statutory power of
decision, the court has no jurisdiction under the Judicial Review
Procedure Act, 1971 to grant the relief available in certiorari
proceedings and that there is no room for the imposition of
procedural duties to be derived from any more pervasive notion
of a duty to act fairly.
The jurisdictional issue would not be of such importance
if it were clear that statutory powers of decision encompassed
all those decisions reviewable by certiorari at common law.
Indeed, the definition itself would appear to be framed in such
a way as to avoid some of the more notorious limitations upon
the scope of certiorari that had developed from the courts'
insistence that the decision under attack be required to be made
upon a judicial or quasi-judicial basis . The provisions of sub-
sections (2), (3), (4) of section 2 only make sense if, in some
respects at least, the term, "statutory power of decision", includes
situations that were excluded, or probably excluded, from the
scope of certiorari . 22 However, the combined effect of recent
English cases on the availability of certiorari and some Ontario
21 However, Parker J. stated, at p. 618, that : "I think in this case we
are governed by the interpretation section of the Judicial Review Procedure
Act, 1971 . . . section 1(f) ."
22 For example, the inclusion of decisions in the definitional s. 1(f) (ii),
"deciding . . . the eligibility of any person or party to receive or to the
continuation of, a benefit or licence, whether he is legally entitled thereto
or not", would appear to have been designed to avoid the distinction drawn
in some licensing decision between "rights" and "privileges" ; see, for exam-
ple, Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, [1951] A.C. 66, a decision now revived, to
an uncertain extent, by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hog,arth v .
National Parole Board (1974), 50 D.L.R. (3d) 349 . Similarly, the reference
to decisions "prescribing" legal rights or eligibility for benefits may well
refer to decisions that have a lis inter partes flavour, but which are con-
tained in legislative form ; see, for example, Wiswell v. Metropolitan Cor-




decisions interpreting the term "statutory power of decision",
suggests that if the view of jurisdiction under the Judicial Review
Procedure Act, 1971, adopted in Robertson and Maurice Rollins
Construction prevails, then some serious lacunae in the legislative
scheme will appear .23
For example, the English Divisional Court has held decisions,
made by a Board established under the prerogative powers of
the Crown, reviewable by certiorari . 24 The same view has been
taken of disciplinary proceedings of a university incorporated
by charten25 In Re Godden'26 the Court of Appeal granted an
order of prohibition on the ground of bias to prevent the making
of a recommendation that would, although not binding, have
a powerful impact upon the final decision-maker . In R. v. Liver-
pool Corporation ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators'
Association'27 the English Court, of Appeal issued an order of
prohibition to prevent the corporation from implementing a
resolution to increase the number of licences that it would grant,
without first honouring 'an undertaking to afford to existing
licensees an opportunity to be heard. Lord Denning M.R . thought
that the corporation would have been under a duty to hear even
23 The English Law Commission, op. cit, footnote . 4, has recommend-
ed, at p . 20, that the availability of declarations and injunctions in the
public law field should not be limited to the exercise or failure to exercise
a statutory power, since "it is clear that judicial review is not limited to
statutory, powers" . Instead, the Commission has proposed, at p . 21, that :
"The Court should be directed to have regard to the nature of the matters
in respect of which, and the nature of the persons or bodies against whom,
relief may be granted by way of the prerogative orders and (in view of the
special case of the declaration as to subordinate legislation and the develop-
ing scope of the prerogative orders themselves) to the justice and con-
venience of the case in the light of all its circumstances."
24 R . v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte Lain, [1967]
2 Q.B. 864 .
25R. v . Aston University ex parte Roffey, [1969] 2 Q.B . 538, a deci-
sion, however, which must be regarded as seriously weakened by the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeal in Herring v . Templeman, [1973] 3 All E.R.
569 . See- also Re Vanek and Governors of The University of Alberta
(1976), 57 D.L.R . (3d) 595 (Alta S.C . App . Div.) . In Re Thomas and
Committee of College Presidents (1973), 37 D .L.R. (3d) 69 (Ont .), the
Divisional Court refused relief in the nature of certiorari, holding that
the respondents were too far removed from any grant of power under the
University of Guelph Act, S.O., 1964, c. 120 and that letters patent had
conferred no adjudicative duty . Contrast, Re Polten and Governing Council
of University of Toronto (1976), 8 O.R. (2d) 749 (Div . Ct) .
26 [19711 3 All E.R. 482 .
27 [1972] 2 Q.B . 299 . In Ré Multi-Malls Inc . and Minister of Trans-
portation and Communications (1976), Ont . C.A ., as yet unreported, the
reasoning in Liverpool Taxi was adopted .
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if it had not given the assurance.28 Finally, in R. v. London
Borough of Hillingdon ex parte Royco Homes Ltd,29 Lord
Widgery C.J. appears to have severed any lingering connection
between the prerogative order of certiorari and the existence of
a duty upon the body whose decision is under attack to act
judicially.
If Robertson is correct, then it is doubtful whether the
Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, provides a remedy on
the facts of any of these cases.;° For example, in Re Raney3l
the applicants sought to have set aside a recommendation to
the Minister by a non-statutory body within the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications that the value of the con-
tracts for which the applicants should be in future allowed to
tender be reduced. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that
since the committee derived no power from statute its recom-
mendations did not constitute the exercise of a statutory power
of decision . The court also added, in response to the alternative
argument that certiorari lay, that the recommendation of the
committee could not be quashed because its function was not
judicial . Florence Nightingale32 appears analogous to Godden,
28 Ibid., at p. 307 .
29 [1974] 2 All E.R . 643 . It should be noted that the basis of the
attack in Royco was substantive, not procedural, ultra vires. It would be
premature to conclude from the availability of certiorari to quash that a
judicial-type hearing is a condition precedent to a valid decision . The
Supreme Court of Canada, on the other hand, appears to have linked
inextricably the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Appeal under the
Federal Court Act, supra, footnote 3, s . 28, with the availability of certiorari
and the rules of natural justice : Howarth v . National Parole Board, supra,
footnote 22 . See also, Martineau and Butters v . Matsqui Institution, [1976]
2 F.C . 198 (Fed. Ct App.) .
The primary significance of Royco in English administrative law is that
by allowing a decision to be challenged by means of the motion procedure
of certiorari, without requiring that the right of appeal to the Minister first
be exhausted, expeditious access to the courts is provided for those dissatis-
fied with planning decisions. It also opens the possibility of conferring
upon neighbours locus standi to challenge planning decisions . Standing had
previously been denied under both the statutory remedy to quash (Buxton
v . Minister of Housing and Local Government, 11961] 1 Q.B . 278), and
an action for a declaration (Gregory v. London Borough of Camden,
[1966] 2 All E.R . 196) . Contrast, Lord Nelson Hotel Ltd v . City of
Halifax (1973), 33 D.L.R . (3d) 98 (N.S . Sup. Ct App. Div .) .
30 Legal proceedings would thus have to be brought by way of an
action for a declaration or an injunction unless the relief was in respect
of the exercise of a "statutory power" .
31 (1975), 4 O.R . (2d) 249 (C.A.) .
32 Supra, footnote 20 . Compare, Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Com-
mission (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C .) ; Saulnier v. Quibec Police




although in the former case the court resorted to the statutory
definition and thus avoided the substantive difficulties of
determining the procedure that the court should appropriately
impose upon the agency before the final stage of the administrative
process. However,'it should also be pointed out that in subsequent
decisions some non-final decisions have been encompassed within
the court's jurisdiction .33 Lastly, in Robertson itself, the Divisional
Court unanimously adopted an approach to the definition of
"statutory power of decision" that was remarkably similar to
the dichotomy made in some cases at common law between
judicial and administrative decisions34
No reference was made to Robertson or Florence Nightingale
in Chadwill Coal Co. Ltd v. Treasurer etc. for Province of
33 See, for example, Zadrevec v . Town of Brampton (1972), 28 D.L.R.
(3d) 641 (Out . Div . Ct), rev'd on other grounds, [1973] 3 O.R. 498 (C.A.) ;
Re Hershoran and City of Windsor (1974), 1 O.R. (2d) 291 (Div . Ct),
aff'd. (1974), 45 D.L.R . (3d) 533 (Out . C.A.) ; Re Orangeville Highlands
Ltd and A .G . of Ontario (1975), 8 O.R. (2d) 97 (Div. Ct) . In Re London
Gardens Ltd and Township of Westminster (1976), 9 O.R. (2d) 175, the
Divisional Court held that a preliminary ruling by an Assessment Review
Court that the taxpayer had the onus of proof, was the exercise of a
statutory power of decision, but in its discretion refused relief. Compare
the view adopted by the Federal Court of Appeal of its jurisdiction under
the Federal Court Act, 1970, supra, footnote 3, s. 28 to set aside "a
decision or order . . . made by or in the course of proceedings before a
federal board, commission or other tribunal . . ." (emphasis added) . Thus
in A.G . Can. v . Cylien, [1973] F.C . 1166, Jackett C.J . held that review
under s . 28 extended only to the exercise or purported exercise of "the
specific jurisdiction or powers conferred by the statute" (at p . 1175), and
not to the "myriad of decisions or orders that the tribunal must make in
the course of the decision-making process" (at p . 1173) .
84 The court held that the respondentd were not "deciding or prescribing
the legal rights, privileges . . ." of the applicants because, "the right or
privilege of the applicants to have their children attend a particular school
is not a legal right or privilege and is not subject to judicial review under
the Ontario statutes as they stand . The decision to close the school was
an administrative decision . . ." (at p . 60) . The court stated that the adjec-
tive "legal" in s . 1(f) (i) qualified all the succeeding nouns, and not simply
"rights" . Moreover, the applicants' contention that the Board's decision fell
under s . 1(f)(ii) on the ground that it decided or prescribed "the eligibility
of any person . . . to the continuation of a benefit or licence, whether he
is legally entitled thereto or not . . .", failed, since "the respondent Board
were deciding as a matter of policy and prudent administration, whether
or not the school ought to be closed to all students, not whether one or
a group should be eligible or ineligible to attend it" (at p . 61) . In the
Liverpool Taxi case, supra, footnote 27, the corporation's decision to
increase the number of licences available was as clearly one of "policy
and prudent administration", rather than one of deciding the legal rights
or privileges or the eligibility of existing licensees, as was that of the
Board in Robertson, supra, footnote 10 .
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Ontario35 when the court was prepared to review a ruling by
hearing officers, appointed to inquire and report to the Minister,
either as an exercise of a statutory power of decision or as a
matter reviewable -at common law by prohibition . In Re
Hershoran and City of Windsor36 an application was made to
the Divisional Court to declare invalid a by-law made by the
city and approved by the Minister of Municipal Affairs,
expropriating the applicants' land, upon which tax arrears had
accrued. The ground of attack was that the applicants had not
received adequate notice before the by-law was passed. In
holding for the applicants, Hughes J. stated that the provisions
of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, "do not, in my
view, deprive this court of any of its inherent powers and in
particular of those powers of supervision which it derived from
the Court of Queen's Bench"37
35 Supra, footnote 20. See, also, Re Thomas and Committee of Col-
lege Presidents, supra, footnote 25 ; Re Raney, supra, footnote 31 .
3s Supra, footnote 33 .
37 Ibid., at p. 312 . The judgment, in other respects, presents difficulties.
For the court appears to hold that the municipality was bound by the
Statutory Powers Procedure Act, 1971, supra, footnote 13, despite s . 3 (2) (h)
which excludes from the ambit of the Act, "proceedings of a tribunal
empowered to make . . . by-laws insofar as its power to make by-laws is
concerned". The court treated this as a privative clause which would not
protect a municipality which had exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to
discharge its quasi-judicial duty to hold a hearing, in accordance with
Wiswell, supra, footnote 23, before a by-law was passed . However, the
courts have never adopted the same attitude to partial exclusion clauses
as they have to those purporting totally to exclude judicial review : Smith
v . East Elloe R.D .C ., [1956] A.C. 736, Pringle v . Fraser [1972] S.C.R . 821 .
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada in Law Society of Upper Canada
v . French (1974), 49 D.L.R . (3d) 1, was prepared to find, at p . 15, on
less substantial grounds than are to be found in the express words of s.
3(2)(h), that the Law Society Act, R.S.O ., 1970, c. 238, had by implication
excluded one limb of the rules of natural justice .
The Divisional Court's interpretation deprives s. 3(2)(h) of any legal
effect, in that it is, in any event, only capable of applying to those aspects
of by-law making that at common law are required to be performed in a
quasi-judicial manner. The reasoning was recently adopted in Atkinson v.
Municipality of Metro Toronto (1976), 12 O.R . (2d) 401, at p . 414 (C.A.) .
The section is now explicable only on the basis of incluslo ex abundant!
cautela. Of course, the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, 1971, ibid.,
should not be regarded as an exhaustive code of administrative procedure :
see Mullan, Fairness : The New Natural Justice (1975), 25 U.T.L.J . 281 .
Insofar as the court, at p . 315, appears to require a hearing to be
held both by the municipality and by the Minister before he decides
whether to approve the by-laws, the reasoning of the Divisional Court
is difficult to reconcile with that of the Court of Appeal in Zadrevec




In addition, in Re Canada Metal Co. Ltd and MacFarlane,38
Keith J. entertained an application for judicial review under
the Judicial Review Procedure Act, section 6(2), in which the
applicants sought to have set aside a stop order issued under
the Environmental Protection Act.-39 The learned judge proceeded
on the basis that the availability of the relief sought depended
upon whether the decision of the official was reviewable by
certiorari. He found that it was, and set the stop order aside
on the ground that there was insufficient admissible evidence to
satisfy the conditions upon which the power was exercisable.4° The
judgment makes no reference to whether the official was exercising
a statutory power of decision. Similarly, in Re Dabor Motors Ltd
and MacCormac,41 the Divisional Court dealt with an application
to set aside, for lack of an opportunity to be heard, a proposal
made by the registrar under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act42
to suspend the applicant's registration, by considering whether
there was a .decision that was reviewable by certiorari. The court
held that since the registrar had no power to make a final decision,
and a full de novo hearing was available before the Commercial
Registration Appeal Tribunal, "this application is premature,
it being our finding that no decision has yet been made"43
Whilst in this case the court reached the same result as it would
have reached had it considered that its jurisdiction depended
upon finding a statutory power of decision exercisable by the
registrar, its resort to the more flexible rules of common law
facilitated consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole,44
and the impact upon the individual of the registrar's proposal.
Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971
and the Common Law Motion to Quash
The converse of the jurisdictional issue raised by Robertson
is the extent to which the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971,
displaces or provides alternative remedies of judicial review, other
38 (1974), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (Ont . H.C.) .
39 S.O ., 1971, c . 86, s. 75 .
40 Under s . 7, the Director must have "reasonable and probable grounds"
to believe that the discharge of the pollutant constitutes "an immediate
danger to human life, the health of any person, or to property" .
41 (1975), 5 O.R . (2d) 473 .
42 S.O ., 1971, c . 21, ss 6(2), 7 .
43 Supra, footnote 41, at p. 477 .
44 Similarly, in Zadrevec, supra, footnote 33, neither the Divisional
Court nor the Court of Appeal rendered decision upon the basis of whether
the municipality was exercising a statutory power of decision.
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than the prerogative orders contained in section 2(1) . The
Act does not abolish any of the common law remedies, but
provides that proceedings commenced for such a remedy shall
be treated as an application for judicial review45
Prior to the enactment of the Judicial Review Procedure
Act, 1971, it was settled law in Ontario that the decision of a
consensual arbitrator was reviewable upon a summary motion
to quash. The remedy was procedurally similar to certiorari in
respect of decisions made by statutory bodies, although the
proper scope of review has been controversial" In Port Arthur
Shipbuilding Company Ltd v . Arthurs'47 Judson J ., in the course
of considering the appellant company's remedy if the arbitrator
whose decision was under attack were characterized as non-
statutory, stated : 48
The notice of motion in these proceedings makes it clear that the relief
asked for is an order quashing the award. It does not seem to me to be
of any consequence that the motion contains a reference to certiorari .
The procedure is the same and in my opinion the notice of motion is
sufficient to justify an order quashing the award .
The Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, however, does
make it important to determine the appropriate remedy . For if
the ordinary motion to quash an arbitrator's decision is a pro
ceeding by way of application in the nature of certiorari within
section 2 (1), review must normally be sought before the Divisional
Court ; if it is not, then the matter will be heard by a single judge
of the High Court. The issue is whether the language of section
2(l) includes remedies analogous to certiorari . A number of
reasons may be advanced for adopting a wide construction of
the Act. First, the words, "in the nature of", rather than, "in lieu
of", evince a legislative intent to include remedies procedurally
45 S . 7 . S . 8 confers a discretion upon a judge before whom is brought
an action for a declaration or an injunction in relation to the exercise of a
statutory power, to treat it as an application for judicial review .
48 Since Government of Kelantan v . Duff Development Co. Ltd,
[1923] A.C . 395, the Supreme Court has allowed review for error of law
on the face of a consensual arbitration award, except in respect of the
precise point of law referred by the parties to the arbitrator. The scope of
review in this latter situation and the flexibility that courts should adopt in
drawing the distinction have been controverted : see, especially, Bell Canada
v. Office and Professional Employees Union, [1974] S.C.R . 335 ; Metro-
politan Toronto Police Association v . Metropolitan Toronto Board of Com-
missioners of Police, [1975] 1 S.C.R . 630 .
47 (1968), 70 D.L.R.(2d) 693 (S.C.C .) .




and substantively similar to the order that replaced the writ
of certiorari4a Secondly, since there may be substantial similarity
in the issues raised in reviewing arbitrations, the Act should be
construed to vest jurisdiction in .the Divisional Court, which the
1971 legislation intended to develop an expertise in administrative
law, whether, before the Act, review would have been sought
through the ordinary motion to quash, certiorari or the Arbitra-
tions Act.5° Thirdly, it would be inconsistent with an important
aim of the 1971 Act, namely, simplification of the procedures
and remedies of judicial review, to subject litigants to the hazards
of delay and expense involved in selecting the wrong forum
or remedy . For example, in Re Metropolitan Toronto Board of
Commissioners of Police and Metropolitan Toronto Police Asso-
ciation, 51 Arnup J.A ., disagreeing with the court below5'- held
that an arbitrator appointed under the terms of a collective
agreement, which was not statutorily required to contain an
arbitration clause, was consensual under the Port Arthur test.5j
Since proceedings in this case were instituted before the Judicial
Review Procedure Act, 1971, came into force the court did
not have to decide the jurisdictional problem discussed above.
However, in Re Ontario Provincial Police Association Inc.
and the Queen, 54 the Divisional Court held that it had jurisdiction
to review consensual arbitrations . Keith J. rested his judgment
upon the legislative choice of the words, "in the nature of",
rather than, "in lieu of" the prerogative orders specified in
paragraph 1 of section 2(l) . If this decision is correct, then
the Divisional Court, subject to the exercise of discretion by a
single judge of the High Court under section 6(2), has exclusive
jurisdiction to review both statutory and consensual arbitrations .
4s Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice, R.R.O ., 1970, Reg . 545,
rs 629, 630, repealed by O . Reg . 115/72, s. 18 .
50 R.S.O., 1970, c. 25, s. 12 .
51 [19721 2 O.R. 793, at p. 799 .
52 [1972] 1 O.R. 409 . The case was ultimately argued and decided on
the basis that the arbitration was consensual : supra, footnote 46, at pp . 632,
653 .
53 Supra, footnote 51, Arnup J.A ., at p. 799, left open the question of
whether an arbitrator appointed under the statutory procedure would have
been a statutory arbitrator. For the position after the Police Amendment
Act, S.O., 1972, c . 103, s . 2, see, Re Metropolitan Toronto Board of Com-
missioners of Police and Metropolitan Toronto Police Association (1975),
5 O.R. (2d) 285 .
54 (1974), 3 O.R . (2d) 698 .
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Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971
and Other Statutory Remedies
What, however, if the applicant seeks a statutory remedy
of judicial review, such as, for example is contained in the
Arbitrations Act, section 12? The problem was considered in
Re Brown and the Queen,55 where it was argued that an applica-
tion made under the Judicature Act56 for a motion to quash a
conviction must, by virtue of the Judicial Review Procedure Act,
1971, section 7, now be treated as an application for judicial
review, and unless the case was urgent must be heard by the
Divisional Court. Morden J. stated that the 1971 Act was
intended to deal with the difficulties inherent in the dual system
of common law remedies ; no such problems had existed with
statutory motions to quash. He held that the reference in the
1971 Act to an "application for an order in the nature of . . .
certiorari" should be construed only to take account of the
substitution of the writ of certiorari by an application on an
originating notice for an order.
It is generally agreed that the procedural reforms contained
in the Judicature Act and their analogue in civil procedure-
first introduced in Ontario in 188857 -did not extend the
availability or the scope of the remedy formerly obtained by
writ.-58 However, it is submitted that no firm conclusion should
be drawn merely from the use of the words, "in the nature of",
in the 1971 Act. For whilst it is true that the procedural
reforms in Ontario did not generally use this formula and that
the orders were commonly referred to as orders "in lieu of
certiorari", the words, "in the nature of", have often been
employed to denote no more than a procedural reform . For
example, the proceeding instituted by notice of motion in cases
"that were formerly instituted or taken by a writ of quo war-
55 (1976), 11 O.R. (2d) 7.
56 R.S .O ., 1970, c. 228, s. 69(1).
57 Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ontario, 1888, r. 1140,
which provided that the writ should not issue, but that an order should be
substituted "which shall have the saine effect as a writ formerly had" .
Emphasis is added. The rule took its modern form in 1913, when the
italicized words were replaced by, "but all necessary provisions shall be
made in the judgment or order" .
5sIn R. v. Cook (1909), 10 O.L.R . 415, Anglin J. held that the
Judicature Amendment Act, S.O ., 1908, c. 34, s. 1 which first provided for
proceedings by notice of motion to quash a conviction, "instead of by
certiorari", did not effect any substantive change in the law, but merely




ranto, or by information in the nature of quo warranto",59 has
been described as "in the nature of quo warranto", even though
the substance of the remedy is identical with that of the old
remedy .E° Moreover, it has not been suggested in other juris-
dictions where the writ procedure has been superseded by a
notice of motion for an order in the nature of the prerogative
orders,B1 that this formula has extended the scope of the
remedies:52
Having decided that the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971
did not confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Divisional Court,
Morden J. in Brown left open the question of whether that Act
provided an alternative remedy to the statutory motion to quash
contained in the Judicature Act, section 69(l) . The Divisional
Court has held in Serre v. Town of Rayside-Balfour63 that an
application can be made to it under the Act to declare a by-law
invalid. The court reasoned that the statutory motion to quash
by-laws provided in the Municipal Act,s4 section 283 is not exhaus-
tive5 and that the effect of the 1971 Act, section 2(l), para-
graph 2, is to enable declaratory relief in respect of the exercise
of a statutory power to be sought in a summary procedure for an
application for judicial review . The court was not required to
decide the issue raised in Brown, namely, whether the statutory
motion to quash was "in the nature of certiorari", and thereby
subsumed under section 7. However, if a litigant were to com-
mence proceedings by way of an action for a declaration that a
by-law was invalid, the trial judge would, by virtue of section 8,
have a discretion to treat the action -as an application for judicial
review and to transfer the matter to the Divisional Court.
59 Judicature Act, supra, footnote 56, s . 147(l) .
so See R . ex rel . Haines v. Hanniwell, [1948] O.R. 46 ; Holmstead and
Gale, Ontario Judicature Act and Rules of Practice, Vol. I (1958), pp. 461-
464 . Although the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, supra, footnote 5,
does not encompass quo warranto proceedings, the words, "in the nature
of", may have been derived from this source and hence, should be given
a narrow construction .
ai See, for example, the Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg . 390/68,
rs 826, 830; N.S . Civil Procedure Rules, 1971, r. _56.02 ; Federal Court
Act, supra, footnote 3, s . 18(b) .
62 Re Vanek and Governors of the University of Alberta, supra, foot-
note 25.
103 (1976), 11 O.R . (2d) 779 (Div . Ct) .
64 R.S.O ., 1970, c. 284 .
65 The court relied upon Wiswell v . Metropolitan Corporation of
Greater Winnipeg, supra, footnote 22, where the Supreme Court allowed an
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The task of determining the impact made by the Judicial
Review Procedure Act, 1971, upon the statutory remedy is com-
plicated by the twelve months limitation period imposed upon the
summary motion to quash by section 286 of the Municipal Act.
The problem arose in Re Dorfman and Town of Fort Erie." The
applicants instituted proceedings under the 1971 Act for declar-
atory relief and for an order setting aside for invalidity a by-law
and resolution07 passed more than twelve months previously by
the respondent. They argued that since they had had no prior op-
portunity to be heard, the respondent had no legal justification for
having demolished their house. Without deciding the merits of the
case, the Divisional Court, in its discretion declined to grant
declaratory relief, on the ground that an award of damages was
the appropriate remedy '3 11 The Divisional Court, of course, has
no jurisdiction over claims for damages, which must still be pur-
sued by way of action . Houlden J . stated :E9
In my opinion, an adequate alternative remedy by way of damages,
in which incidentally the validity of the by-law and resolutions of the
respondent municipality can be questioned, is available to, the applicants
and, therefore, judicial review should be refused .
The italicised portion of this statement, however, appears to
overlook the Municipal Act, section 344, which provides that a
claim for damages for anything done under the authority of a
by-law or resolution may not be pursued within one month of the
quashing or repeal of the by-law or resolution .7°
Indeed, Houlden J. subsequently acknowledged this point,
when rejecting the applicants' argument that the by-law and res-
olution be set aside . 71 He relied upon Re Clements and Toronto"
for the proposition that after the expiry of the limitation period
contained in section 286, by-laws may be attacked only by way
of action . It is curious that the court did not also use this argument
in respect of the claim for declaratory relief, for if the purpose
of section 286 is to protect municipalities from being subjected to
66 (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 186 .
67 The provisions of, inter alia, ss 283 and 286, apply, by virtue of s .
282, to by-laws, orders and resolutions .
6sS . 2(5) preserves the judicial discretion associated with the remedies
listed in s . 2(1) .
69 Supra, footnote 66, at p . 189 (emphasis added) .
71D In Gray v. City of Oshawa, [1971] 3 O.R. 112, Houlden J . refused,
on this ground, to entertain a claim for damages made in a proceeding by
way of an action for a declaration .
71 Ibid .




challenge by summary procedure for longer than a year, it is
difficult to appreciate why the argument in Clements should not
be as applicable to any relief that may be sought in a single
summary proceeding under the 1971 Act. The problem is caused
by a failure to provide in the Act for the effect upon other statutes
of extending summary procedure to declarations in respect of the
exercise of a statutory power. Although the reasoning in Serre73
may suggest that the effect of section 286 can be avoided by
seeking declaratory relief under the Judicial Review Procedure
Act, 1971, it is submitted that since the by-law impugned in that
case was passed within . twelve months of the institution of pro-
ceedings, it is, at best, equivocal on the point.
After being sent empty-handed from the Divisional Court,
what remedy is available to the hapless applicants in Dorfman?
Presumably, they must bring an action before a single judge of the
High Court for a declaration of invalidity .74 May they then
request the judge to exercise his discretion under the Judicial
Review Procedure Act, 1971, section 8, to,
. . . direct that the action be treated and disposed of summarily, insofar
as it relates to the exercise . . . or purported exercise of [a statutory]
power, as if it were an application for judicial review and may order
that the hearing on such issue be transferred to the Divisional Court . . . ?
The Act does not indicate the factors that judges should take
into account in deciding how to exercise their discretion under
this section, although the need for further development of the
facts, 75 or the simplicity of the questions of law in issue should
militate against a transfer to the Divisional Court. The question
73 Supra, footnote 63 . Neither Dorfman nor Clements was cited in the
short reasons given orally by Galligan J .
74 In Re Clements and Toronto, supra, footnote 72, at p . 504, the
Court of Appeal also stated that the clear intent of s. 286 prevailed over
r. 611, under which an application may be made by originating notice for
a declaratory judgment : "When the right of a person depends upon the
construction of a deed, will or other instrument ." See, also, Sun Oil Co. v .
City of Hamilton, [1961] O.R . 209 (C.A .) .
The circumstances in which the validity of a by-law can be raised
collaterally in proceedings instituted summarily are unclear : see, for
example, Re Sekretov and City of Toronto, [1973] 2 O.R . 161 (C.A.)
(the court took jurisdiction on an originating notice under r. 610) ; Re
Sibley and Township of Fenelon (1972), 26 I .L.R. (3d) 541 (Ont . H.C.),
(Keith J. denied jurisdiction in mandamus proceedings brought to require
the issue of a building permit that had been withheld under the impugned
by-law) . Compare, Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v .
Lyttle, [1973] S.C.R. 568 .
75 See, Campbell Soup Co. Ltd v . Farm Products Marketing Board
(1976), 10 O.R . (2d) 405, at p . 441 (H.C.) .
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here, however, is whether the lapse of the limitation period im-
posed upon the summary statutory remedy under the Municipal
Act should conclusively weigh against the positive exercise of
discretion under section 8. The argument for holding a transfer
inappropriate here is that the summary remedy, of general appli-
cation, created by the 1971 Act should not be regarded as having,
by a side wind, been intended to defeat the clear and specific
legislative intent embodied in section 286 of the Municipal Act,
to which the courts have consistently given effect.
If this argument does not prevail, and the judge finds no
other reason for refusing to transfer the matter, what should be
the applicants' position before the Divisional Court? The court
might, of course, return the matter to the trial judge on the
ground that he exercised his discretion on a wrong legal principle.
Alternatively, it might hold that its earlier decision made the
matter res judicata, even though the reasoning upon which, in its
discretion, it had refused to grant declaratory relief contained a
significant error and the applicants were now before the court
after having instituted proceedings by way of an action .
If, however, the court does not dismiss the application on
either of these grounds, it will then be necessary to decide whether
effect should be given to the time limitation of section 286. First,
it may be argued that section 12(l) of the Judicial Review
Procedure Act, 1971 applies the Municipal Act limitation period
to an application for judicial review, irrespective of the relief
sought . For this argument to succeed, however, the statutory
motion to quash would have to be held to be a proceeding in the
nature of certiorari. Secondly, even if, in the face of the reasoning
in Brown, the court accepted this argument, the applicants could
rely upon section 5, which authorizes the court to grant an exten-
sion of time,
[nlotwithstanding any limitation of time for the bringing of an appli-
cation for judicial review fixed by or under any Act, . . . where it is
satisfied that there are prima facie grounds for relief and that no sub-
stantial prejudice or hardship will result to any person affected by reason
of the delay.78
Again, it is open to argument as to whether section 286 imposes
a time limitation upon "an application for judicial review".
Secondly, if section 12, as modified by section 5, is not applicable,
76 The proposals of the Report of the English Law Commission, op . cit .,
footnote 4, on time limitations are to be found at pp. 22-23. Although
public inconvenience may be a reason for refusing relief under s. 2(5), it




then it remains open for the court, under section 2(5), to take
account of any undue delay in the application for relief .
One final barrier stands in the way of the applicants' recovery
of damages, even if they succeed in obtaining a declaration that
the by-law and resolution are invalid. For the Municipal Act,
section 344 provides that the by-law upon which the municipality
relied must have been quashed or repealed. It is not clear whether
a declaration of invalidity suffices for this purpose. In Welbridge
Holdings Ltd v. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg,77
Hunt J. held that the equivalent provision in the Manitoba legis-
latioA7a precluded the recovery of damages even after the by-law
had been declared invalid by the Supreme Court of Canada.79 In
the Manitoba Court of Appeal, Freedman J.A., in a dissenting
opinion, stated that the .earlier proceedings: 8°
. . effectively declared that the by-law was dead, if indeed it was not
still-born. To say it had not been quashed or repealed is simply to play
with words and to ignore substance and reality .
This question was not reached by the majority of the Court of
Appeal nor by the Supreme Court of Canada."' The answer must
depend upon the purposes intended to be served by section 344.
If the legislature intended to allow municipalities an opportunity
to make amends and to protect them from financial liability in
circumstances when a court in the exercise of discretion would not
make an order rendering a by-law invalid, 82 then section 344
should be construed as if quashing included a declaratory judg-
ment . If, on the . other hand, the legislature also intended to im-
pose a short time limitation period, by providing that the munic-
ipality be given early notice of the possibility of a claim for
damages, as a result of the institution of section 283 proceedings
within twelve months of the passing of the by-law, then the
conclusion of Hunt J. is correcat .83 This would, however, not
77 (1969), 4 D.L.R . (3d) 509, at p. 519 (Man . Q.10 .) .
78 Municipal Act, R.S.M ., 1954, c. 173, s. 394.
79 Wiswell v. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, [1965]
S.C.R. 512.
so (1970), 12 D.L.R . (3d) 124, at pp . 137-138 (Man . C.A .) .
81 [1971] S.C.R . 957.
82 This point is brought out by Gray v. City of Oshawa, supra, foot-
note 70, rev'd, [1972] 2 O.R. 856 (C.A .) .
83 Since the Public Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O ., 1970, c. 374,
s. 15 specifically exempts municipalities from the six months limitation
period of section 11, and since the Municipal Act, supra, footnote 64, con
tains time limitation provisions in respect of particular wrongs, (see, for
example, ss 340, 443(2)), it is submitted that interpretation implicit in the
judgment of Hunt 7. is questionable .
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justify a refusal to award damages where, as in Serre v. Township
of Rayside-Balfour, 84 declaratory summary relief was sought with-
in the twelve months limitation period. These considerations give
a, perhaps, unexpected point to the different reasons given by
the Divisional Court in Dorfman for rejecting the applicants'
request for declaratory relief and for setting aside .85
Conclusions
(1) Neither the legislative history nor the plain language of
the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, supports the proposition
that the Divisional Court has jurisdiction to set aside only
decisions that are made in the exercise of a statutory power of
decision.
(2) There are circumstances in which relief may be sought
under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, as an alternative
to a remedy created by some other statute.
(3) The references in the Judicial Review Procedure Act,
1971, to orders in the nature of mandamus, prohibition and
certiorari should not be construed to include remedies, whether
of common law or statutory origin, other than the orders that
were substituted by the Rules of Practice for the prerogative
writs; the words "in the nature of" do not compel an interpreta-
tion of the Act one way or the other.
There is arguably no inconsistency between Re Brown and
Re Ontario Provincial Police Association, in that the 1971 Act
was intended to remove the obscurities and deficiencies of the
common law remedies, whereas similar problems did not sur-
round analogous statutory remedies . Thus, to subject the applicant
to the hazard of commencing proceedings in the wrong court,
the common law motion to quash should be regarded, for the
purpose of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971, as being
"in the nature of certiorari" . However, the 1971 Act was
84 Supra, footnote 63 .
85 It should be noted that unless certiorari were available to quash a
by-law or unless it was made in the exercise of a "statutory power of
decision", the court could not set it aside, -- which presumably would be
considered a quashing for the purpose of s. 344,-even if the applicant
were entitled to declaratory relief : Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971,
supra, footnote S, s. 2(4) . This point is obscured by Re Maurice Rollins
Construction Co . Ltd and Township of South Fredericksburgh, supra, foot-
note 17 . In Re Clements and Toronto, supra, footnote 72, at p. 22 (O.R .),
Laidlaw J.A . stated that, "The jurisdiction of the Court to quash a municipal





intended to simplify the procedure for obtaining judicial review
of the exercise of public power; the source of consensual arbi-
trators' authority is, to a large extent, private in nature. Secondly,
the remedial distinctions between the judicial review of statutory
and consensual arbitration awards reinforce and reflect sub-
stantive differences in the scope of review of the respective
remedies . Thirdly, if Re Brown is correct ; then a distinction will
have to be drawn between the statutory motion under the
Arbitrations Act -and the common law remedy, even though
the issues raised might well be identical.
This, of course, brings into question the correctness of
Re Brown,86 so that, for example, the Municipal Act remedy
of, the application to quash a by-law, should be regarded as a
proceeding "in the nature of certiorari" . It is submitted that
this should be rejected . First, the legislative history of the
Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971 clearly indicates that it
was directed towards reform of the common law remedies.
Secondly, the language of section 2(l), paragraph 1, falls far
short of demanding the conclusion that the legislative purpose
was any broader. Thirdly, to leave' the statutory remedies out-
side the scheme of the 1971 Act would not create a unique
anomaly ; for example, questions of judicial review raised col-
laterally in a claim for damages alone, are not covered by the
Act. Fourthly, the implications of construing the Judicial Review
Procedure Act, 1971, an Act of general application, as entirely
displacing remedies, specifically created by particular statutes,
would have to be worked out piecemeal . In the absence of
more compelling statutory language, there seems little to be
said for adopting a construction of the Act that is likely to
create unnecessary confusion where none previously existed.
J . M. EVANS*
CONTRACTS-DAMAGES FOR MENTAL DISTRESS-INJURY TO
FEELINGS.-Damages for breach of contract are traditionally
viewed as compensation for the pecuniary loss caused by a
ss Unless Re Union Felt Products (Ontario) Ltd and The Queen (1975),
8 O.R. (2d) 438 (H.C.) is wrongly decided, it is difficult to argue that
Re Brown, supra, footnote 55, is properly confined to the review of
criminal proceedings .
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